Georg Kirchsteiger

Contact Publications Working Papers Teaching Curriculum Vitae (pdf)

Georg Kirchsteiger

Welcome to my web site. I am Professor of Microeconomics at the European Center of Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), Université Libre de Bruxelles. I received my PhD from the University of Vienna. Before I moved to Brussels in 2004, I worked at the Universities of Vienna, Tilburg and Maastricht.

My research interests are in the fields of behavioral economics, experimental economics, game theory, and industrial economics. In 2000 I received the Hicks-Tinbergen Medal of the European Economic Association (with Ernst Fehr and Arno Riedl).

I teach graduate microeconomics, behavioral economics, and game theory.

Currently, I am chairperson of the European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society.

Contact

ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles

Office: Av. Roosevelt 42, R42.6.203

Mail: Av. Roosevelt 50, CP 114/04

1050 Brussels

Belgium

E-mail: gkirchst@ulb.ac.be

Phone: + 32 2 650 42 12

Fax: + 32 2 650 44 75

Publications

Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium (with M. Dufwenberg, P. Heidhues, F. Riedel, and J. Sobel), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 78(2), April 2011, 613-639.

General Equilibrium and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions (with C. Alós-Ferrer), Economic Theory, Vol. 44(3), September 2010, 339-360.

Investments into Education - Doing as the Parents Did (with A. Sebald), European Economic Review, Vol. 54(4), May 2010, 501–516.

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (with C. Alós-Ferrer and M. Walzl), Economic Journal, Vol. 120(543), March 2010, 215-243.

Your Morals are Your Moods (with L. Rigotti and A. Rustichini), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 59(2), February 2006, 155-172.

Endogenizing Market Institutions: An Experimental Approach (with M. Niederle and J. Potters), European Economic Review, Vol. 49(7), October 2005, 1827-1853.

Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect (with S. Huck and J. Oechssler), Economic Journal, Vol. 115, July 2005, 689-702 (Technical Appendix).

Employment Duration and Resistance to Wage Reductions (with M. Burda, W. Güth, and H. Uhlig), Homo Oeconomicus, Vol 22(2), 2005, 169-189.

A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity (with M. Dufwenberg), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 47(2), May 2004, 268-298.

Inefficient Equilibria in Lobbying (with A. Prat), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 82(3), December 2001, 349-375.

Theoretically Robust But Empirically Invalid - An Experimental Investigation Into Tax Equivalence (with R. Kerschbamer), Economic Theory, Vol. 16(3), Fall 2000, 719-734.

Reciprocity and Wage Undercutting (with M. Dufwenberg), European Economic Review, Vol. 44(4-6), May 2000, 1069-1078.

Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games (with W. Güth and K. Ritzberger), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23(1), April 1998, 54-74.

Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), European Economic Review, Vol. 42(1), January 1998, 1-34.

Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence (with E. Fehr and S. Gächter), Econometrica, Vol. 65(4), July 1997, 833-860.

On the Possibility of Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods through Government Subsidies (with C. Puppe), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 66(3), December 1997, 489-504.

On the Formation of Political Coalitions (with C. Puppe), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 153(2), June 1997, 293-319.

Involuntary Unemployment and Non-Compensating Wage Differentials in an Experimental Labour Market (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), Economic Journal, Vol. 106, January 1996, 106-121.

Intransitive Choices Based on Transitive Preferences: The Case of Menu-Dependent Information (with C. Puppe), Theory and Decision, Vol.41(1), June 1996, 37-58.

Reciprocal Fairness and Noncompensating Wage Differentials (with E. Fehr and S. Gächter), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 152(4), December 1996, 608-640.

Insider Power, Wage Discrimination, and Fairness (with E. Fehr), Economic Journal, Vol. 104, May 1994, 571-583; Reprinted in: Behavioral Macroeconomics, Ian McDonald (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012.

The Role of Envy in Ultimatum Games, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 25(3), December 1994, 373-389.

Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108(2), May 1993, 437-459.

Working Papers

Limited Farsightedness in Network Formation (with M. Mantovani, A. Mauleon, and Vincent Vannetelbosch), mimeo, May 2013.

Learning and Market Clearing: Theory and Evidence (with C. Alós-Ferrer), mimeo, February 2013.

Assignment procedure biases in randomized policy experiments (with G. Aldashev and A. Sebald), mimeo, November 2012.

Loss Aversion and Consumption Choice: Theory and Experimental Evidence (with H. Karle and M. Peitz), CEPR Discussion Paper 9183, October 2012.

Good rankings are bad - Why reliable rankings can hurt consumers (with L. Bouton), CEPR Discussion Paper 8702, December 2011.

Teaching

Courses 2012-2013

Game Theory with Applications to Economics (ECON-S-412):

- Course description