Contact Publications Working Papers Teaching Curriculum Vitae (pdf)

Georg Kirchsteiger
Welcome to my web site. I am Professor of Microeconomics at the European Center of Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), Université Libre de Bruxelles. I received my PhD from the University of Vienna. Before I moved to Brussels in 2004, I worked at the Universities of Vienna, Tilburg and Maastricht. My research interests are in the fields of behavioral economics, experimental economics, game theory, and industrial economics. In 2000 I received the Hicks-Tinbergen Medal of the European Economic Association (with Ernst Fehr and Arno Riedl). I teach graduate microeconomics, behavioral economics, and game theory. Currently, I am chairperson of the European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society.
Contact
ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles Office: Av. Roosevelt 42, R42.6.203 Mail: Av. Roosevelt 50, CP 114/04 1050 Brussels Belgium	E-mail: gkirchst@ulb.ac.be Phone:   + 32 2 650 42 12 Fax:     + 32 2 650 44 75
Publications
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium (with M. Dufwenberg, P. Heidhues, F. Riedel, and J. Sobel), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 78(2), April 2011, 613-639. General Equilibrium and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions (with C. Alós-Ferrer), Economic Theory, Vol. 44(3), September 2010, 339-360. Investments into Education - Doing as the Parents Did (with A. Sebald), European Economic Review, Vol. 54(4), May 2010, 501–516. On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (with C. Alós-Ferrer and M. Walzl), Economic Journal, Vol. 120(543), March 2010, 215-243. Your Morals are Your Moods (with L. Rigotti and A. Rustichini), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 59(2), February 2006, 155-172. Endogenizing Market Institutions: An Experimental Approach (with M. Niederle and J. Potters), European Economic Review, Vol. 49(7), October 2005, 1827-1853. Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect (with S. Huck and J. Oechssler), Economic Journal, Vol. 115, July 2005, 689-702 (Technical Appendix). Employment Duration and Resistance to Wage Reductions (with M. Burda, W. Güth, and H. Uhlig), Homo Oeconomicus, Vol 22(2), 2005, 169-189. A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity (with M. Dufwenberg), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 47(2), May 2004, 268-298. Inefficient Equilibria in Lobbying (with A. Prat), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 82(3), December 2001, 349-375. Theoretically Robust But Empirically Invalid - An Experimental Investigation Into Tax Equivalence (with R. Kerschbamer), Economic Theory, Vol. 16(3), Fall 2000, 719-734. Reciprocity and Wage Undercutting (with M. Dufwenberg), European Economic Review, Vol. 44(4-6), May 2000, 1069-1078. Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games (with W. Güth and K. Ritzberger), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23(1), April 1998, 54-74. Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), European Economic Review, Vol. 42(1), January 1998, 1-34. Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence (with E. Fehr and S. Gächter), Econometrica, Vol. 65(4), July 1997, 833-860. On the Possibility of Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods through Government Subsidies (with C. Puppe), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 66(3), December 1997, 489-504. On the Formation of Political Coalitions (with C. Puppe), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 153(2), June 1997, 293-319. Involuntary Unemployment and Non-Compensating Wage Differentials in an Experimental Labour Market (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), Economic Journal, Vol. 106, January 1996, 106-121. Intransitive Choices Based on Transitive Preferences: The Case of Menu-Dependent Information (with C. Puppe), Theory and Decision, Vol.41(1), June 1996, 37-58. Reciprocal Fairness and Noncompensating Wage Differentials (with E. Fehr and S. Gächter), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 152(4), December 1996, 608-640. Insider Power, Wage Discrimination, and Fairness (with E. Fehr), Economic Journal, Vol. 104, May 1994, 571-583. The Role of Envy in Ultimatum Games, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 25(3), December 1994, 373-389. Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108(2), May 1993, 437-459.
Working Papers
Good rankings are bad - Why reliable rankings can hurt consumers (with L. Bouton), CEPR Discussion Paper 8702, December 2011. Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation (with M. Mantovani, A. Mauleon, and Vincent Vannetelbosch), CEPR Discussion Paper 8263, February 2011. How (Not) to Decide: Procedural Games (with G. Aldashev and A. Sebald), ECORE Discussion Paper 2010/81, August 2010. Learning and Market Clearing (with C. Alós-Ferrer), mimeo, February 2008; Previous version under the title: Does Learning Lead to Coordination on Market Clearing Institutions?
Teaching
Courses 2011-2012 Game Theory with Applications to Economics (ECON-S-412): - Course description - When and where - Lectures: L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7, L8, L9, L10, L11, L12 - Problem sets: L1/2-a, L1/2-b, L3/4, L5/6, L7/8, L9/10-a, L9/10-b, L9/10-c, L11/12 Graduate Microeconomics I (ECON-S-510): - Course description - When and where - Lectures: L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7, L8, L9, L10, L11, L12 - Problem sets: PS1, PS2, PS3, PS4, PS5, PS6, PS7, PS8, PS9 Behavioral Economics (ECON-S-513): - Course description plus reading list - When and where - Lectures: L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7, L8, L9, L10, L11, L12 Graduate Microeconomics III (ECON-S-519) - Course description plus reading list - When and Where - Lectures: L1, L2, L3